Recalibrating Judicial Power: An Analysis of Pakistan’s 26th Constitutional Amendment and Its Democratic Implications

Abstract

The 26th Constitutional Amendment (2024) to Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution represents a pivotal shift in the country’s judicial landscape, recalibrating the balance between judicial independence and political accountability. This amendment introduces sweeping reforms, including the restructuring of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP) to grant greater influence to parliamentary and executive actors in judicial appointments, replacing the seniority-based selection of the Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) with a politically mediated process, and imposing new restrictions on the Supreme Court’s suo motu jurisdiction under Article 184(3). Proponents argue these changes enhance transparency and curb judicial overreach, while critics warn they risk undermining the separation of powers and eroding the judiciary’s role as a constitutional check on executive and legislative excesses. Drawing on comparative constitutional frameworks such as India’s NJAC judgment (2015) and Kenya’s judicial reforms this analysis assesses whether the amendment strikes a sustainable balance or facilitates democratic backsliding. 

Keywords: 26th Constitutional Amendment, Judicial Independence, Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP), Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP), Suo Motu Jurisdiction, Separation of Powers, Basic Structure Doctrine, Democratic Backsliding, Pakistan 1973 Constitution, Judicial Accountability