



Sociology & Cultural Research Review (SCRR)
 Available Online: <https://scrrjournal.com>
 Print ISSN: [3007-3103](#) Online ISSN: [3007-3111](#)
 Platform & Workflow by: [Open Journal Systems](#)



Hybrid Democracy of Pakistan: A Challenge to the Sovereignty of People

Dr. Asghar Raza Burfat

Department of Political Science University of Sindh

aburfat@gmail.com

Bakhtawar Talpur

Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Sindh

bakhtawa.talpur@usindh.edu.pk

Hansraj Oad

Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Sindh

hansrajhansoad@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The political system in Pakistan cannot be classified into a binary category but it continues to be a hybrid democracy. This model is a tactical combination of formal democratic institutions like regular elections and a constitutional system with a deep-rooted authoritarian heart of power held by the military establishment of the country. This paper presents a thesis that this hybridity presents a structural and inherent challenge to the principle of popular sovereignty, according to which the people are formally stipulated as the ultimate source of political power. This study uses the qualitative and analytical approach to deconstruct the pillars that support this hybrid regime. It explores the highly advanced processes of political engineering that turn elections into management tools, and not into popular will. It also examines the court, the interface that tends to sanction the establishment preferences, the coercive media administration machine that governs the discourse of people and the economic empire of the military which forms a strong vested interest in the preservation of the political status quo. The overall effect of these arrangements is a critical lack of sovereignty that makes parliament subservient to key national policy making and undermines trust of the electoral system by the people. The article concludes that the difference between the ideal of popular sovereignty in the Constitution and the reality of military dominance is the crisis of the Pakistani rule. Without a decisive alteration of the situation towards a true preeminence of the citizen, the sovereignty of the people will be another myth, and it will always remain inferior to the needs of an unreflected oligarchy.

Keywords: Hybrid Democracy, Pakistan, Popular Sovereignty, Military Establishment, Political Engineering, Civil-Military Relations, Competitive Authoritarianism

Introduction

Pakistan is a country that stands in a great political paradox, it constantly elects its government, but is continuously ruled by strong non electionary institutions. The country has held several general elections since it became a nominal democracy in 2008, each of which has been characterized by lively, although possibly disorderly, political campaigns. But this facade of electoral democracy conceals the more brutal truth in which the ultimate power is not always vested in the representatives of the people, but in the permanent military. This perpetual force relationship results in a political structure in which civilian administrations work within restricted and unstable parameters, whose existence depends on how willing the generals are to accept them. The institutions meant to be the mainstays of the state the parliament and the executive often seem to be mere actors in a play whose script is chiefly written in the

headquarters of the military and its intelligence agencies. This is the ongoing battle between the ballot box and the barracks, which is the very dilemma of the Pakistani political identity, a rift that has not allowed the true democratic rule to be consolidated in spite of formal compliance with some of its procedures (Shah, 2022).

This contradictory system can be thought of as a paradoxical type of democracy, a form of regime that is tactical in integrating democratic facades with core elements of authoritarian regimes. Such systems are conceptualized by scholars such as Levitsky and Way (2010) as competitive authoritarianism, in which democratic institutions are in place, giving a facade of legitimacy, but are manipulated systematically by those in power. This hybridity is not a one-time fling in the Pakistani context but a highly institutionalized mode of governance. It is characterized by a nominal adherence to constitutionalism, regular multiparty elections, and working, though usually suppressed, civil society. However, such democratic attributes are always weakened due to the overwhelming power of the military establishment which has the veto power on major policy areas especially foreign affairs, national security, and internal politics engineering both directly and indirectly (Siddiqi, 2021). The outcome is the existence of a dual state, a visible constitutional state, run by civilians, and an invisible deep state, run by the military, which is the ultimate power structure.

It is against this background that this article is based on its generalized thesis: the hybrid form of democracy in Pakistan, which is marked by the inseparable role played by the military establishment, is essentially a challenge to the sovereignty of the people as stated in the constitution of Pakistan. The Constitution of Pakistan (1973) leaves no doubt on this when it was declared that the State shall be exercising its powers and authority by means of the elected representatives of the people. But the practical state of hybrid governance directly contravenes this principle. When one of the military institutions can arrange the ascent and descent of political parties, control the election process, and determine national policy without any check to the people, the very idea of the people as the sovereign source of authority turns into a legal fiction. In this paper, the historical origins of this hybridity will be followed, its modern-day mechanisms will be examined, starting with political engineering and culminating in judicial coercion, and the impact of this system on the continuous creation of a sovereignty deficit, which makes the will of the electorate secondary to the interests of an unelected oligarchy (International Crisis Group, 2023).

Literature Review

The theoretical basis of the given analysis lies in the literature on the topic of the regime that cannot be easily categorized into binarism. In their foundational theories of democratic transition and consolidation, such as the Linz and Stepan (1996) theories, a distinct process of states transitioning out of authoritarianism to the transitional stage and into a consolidated democracy, where the military no longer has any reserved domains of power, is posited. But the oscillation of Pakistan between outright martial law and quasi-civilian rule, challenges this linear model and indicates a state of arrested development. In order to unravel this, the terms, hybrid regimes, and competitive authoritarianism, are invaluable. According to Levitsky and Way (2010), competitive authoritarianism is characterized by the existence of formal democratic institutions and perceptions that they are the main tool of attaining power and yet incumbents continually breach the rules of democracy to the extent that the playing field is skewed seriously. This model is very generalizable, but the Pakistani example has a distinctive feature: it is not always the civilian government that plays the field but a inertial military system that functions both inside and outside the state apparatus. This is reminiscent of the even older, but still current, idea of the so called praetorian state where the military claims itself the supreme decision maker in national politics and believes itself the protector of the ideological and territorial integrity of the state (Huntington, 1968; Perlmutter, 1974). These theoretical lenses offer an important starting point in going beyond the simplistic democracy vs.

dictatorship dichotomy and in examining the institutionalized, yet malleable power-sharing system that characterizes contemporary Pakistan.

Pakistan The historical literature of the country shows a clear unilinear path of the development of the military as a state institution into the most important political and economic center of the state. The historical records of the coups that took place in 1958, 1977 and 1999 and formed a precedent of direct military rule are thoroughly documented in the scholarly works (Jalal, 1995; Rizvi, 2000). But modern-day academia has moved beyond these blatant interventions to the advanced entrenchment of the military in the periods of interstitial civilian existence. The book *Military Inc.* (2017) by Ayesha Siddiqa is a revolutionary work in the analysis of the military economic empire in its broadest sense, revealing how the military has infiltrated large-scale business activities, be it real estate and manufacturing, banking and infrastructure. This military business (*milbus*) generates a strong self-sustaining economic incentive to continue political dominance so that even elected governments are limited by the corporate goodwill of the military. This institutional hegemony is supplemented by its economic control of national security and foreign policy, which is a dynamic that remains intact no matter who may be the civilian government (Fair, 2021). Consequently, the military is not just a political player but a parent organization that has effectively imposed its will on other state institutions to create an enduring structural imbalance, which cannot be corrected by one election (Zaidi, 2021). This historic and institutional study shows that the present hybridity is not an exception but the full-fledged expression of a decades-long venture of military preeminence.

In its normative form, popular sovereignty, following Rousseau, as established in constitutional texts of modern democracies, is the idea that the people are the ultimate power and source of political authority. This principle is being fulfilled with the help of certain, uncompromising conditions. Polyarchy, as explained by Dahl (1998), does not only demand free and fair elections but also an inclusive citizenship, right to expression, right to access alternative information and the capacity of elected officials to exercise control over policy without being subordinate to unelected institutions. This sovereignty is undermined as soon as a *pouvoir constitué* (a constituted power, such as the military) literally replaces the *pouvoir constituant* (the constituent one, the people). According to scholars such as Philip (2021), in order to have a meaningful sovereignty, it should be unbundled out of simple control over territory and must be interpreted as efficiency of self-governance by the people. This ability is pulverized in the event that the basic requirement of civilian control in the military is violated which is one of the pillars of the democratic theory. The literature is obvious: in the absence of this control, elections will be a mere ritual, as opposed to real transfer of power, and sovereignty of people will be a sham of law.

The combination of these three bodies of literature theoretical frameworks on hybridity, historical examination of civil-military relations in Pakistan, and the normative ideas of sovereignty shows that there is an essential gap in the current literature. Although many fine studies have identified the political role of the military (Siddiqa, 2017; Rizvi, 2000), and there have been others that have viewed the system of Pakistan through the prism of competitive authoritarianism (Shah, 2022), it is still necessary to explicitly and systematically tie the mechanics of the hybrid regime in Pakistan to the precise and systematic de-institutionalization of popular A lot of the literature looks at the influence of the military as the issue of governance or political stability. The current paper, however, believes that the problem runs deeper: that this is a crisis of constitutional legitimacy and popular will. Thus, this paper seeks to address this gap by arguing that the hybrid state of the Pakistan democracy is not only a description of the political system in the country but the very process through which the sovereignty of the people is constantly undermined. It will show that the instruments of political engineering of hybrid governance, co-option of the judiciary, and media influence are not only methods of

maintaining power, but also direct attacks on the principle of the democratic principle of self-governance.

Research Objectives

1. To trace the historical evolution of the hybrid political system in Pakistan.
2. To identify and analyze the contemporary tools and methods used by unelected institutions to maintain political influence.
3. To critically assess the impact of this hybridity on key pillars of popular sovereignty: free elections, accountable governance, and civilian supremacy.
4. To provide a critical analysis of the prospects for genuine democratic consolidation in Pakistan.

Research Questions

1. What are the historical and institutional factors that have sustained the hybrid democratic model in Pakistan?
2. What are the key mechanisms (e.g., political engineering, judicial influence, media control) through which unelected institutions exert power in the contemporary era?
3. What are the tangible consequences of this power dynamic for electoral integrity, parliamentary supremacy, and public trust in democratic processes?

Methodology

The research design used in this study is a qualitative and analytical study as it breaks down the complexities of power relationship within Pakistan of hybrid democracy and the resultant threat to popular sovereignty. The qualitative approach is best suited to this deeply institutionalized and non-linear phenomenon since it would enable one to explore in a deeper way the context, processes, and meanings that cannot be discussed by quantitative data alone. Desk-based research is the main method of inquiry, which systematically employs a broad range of secondary sources to create a multi-layered evidentiary foundation. The basis of this foundation is built on the basis of strict scholarly books and peer-reviewed journal articles, which will give the theoretical and historical background in civil-military relations and democratic theory. In order to place the analysis in the context of the current realities, this academic article is complemented with the reports of the internationally-known monitoring organizations like Freedom House and the International Crisis Group which provide professional evaluations of the democratic health and political stability. Moreover, in order to follow the dynamism of hybridity in real-time, the study will be based on critical commentary of the national and international reputable news channels, which will be used to chronicle the events of the political, electoral, and institutional disputes.

The thematic and content analysis are used in a dual approach and applied in a systematic manner to the data corpus collected. To identify, analyze and report patterns or themes in the data that directly address the mechanisms of hybrid governance, thematic analysis is applied. This will mean coding the text on recurring patterns like political engineering, judicial co-option, media manipulation and economic coercion, and then one will be able to have systematic explanations of how the military impacts are exerted in ways other than the crude tool of a coup. At the same time, the content analysis is used to objectively study the content of the most important documents, including the Constitution of Pakistan, the decisions of the judicial bodies on the most significant political cases, and the wording of the official military communications. Through the examination of such content, the study will be able to find out any discernible patterns and biases that will indicate the power structure and the discursive explanations. The combination of these two techniques of analysis makes it possible to conduct a vigorous inquiry that no longer describes but critically analyses how the patterns of influence and manipulation as a whole undermine the principles of democratic sovereignty, which offers

a consistent answer to the question of how the systemic undermining of the people will be made possible.

Genesis of Hybridity in Pakistan

Pakistan hybrid democracy can be traced back to its traumatic birth that shaped a paradigm of a security state even before its actual formation. The newly independent Pakistani state had been established right in the middle of the communal carnage of Partition and was plunged directly into a territorial dispute with India over Kashmir; it had the sense of being under constant siege. This existential panic made the military and bureaucracy to be the main guarantor of the existence of the nation, pushing aside the political process and placing the national identity in the perception of external threats (Nawaz, 2021). This initial imbalance was compounded by the early demise of its founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and the assassination of its first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, which left a vacuum of acceptable political leadership, which was soon filled by the civilian bureaucracy and military apparatus. Thus the institutional structure of the state was constructed not on the foundations of popular sovereignty and strong parliamentary culture, but the need to unify the country and protect it by centralized control. This primacy of the security structure over political development early formed a path dependency whereby the military itself considered itself as the ultimate protector of the national interest, a self-appointed position that would justify its frequent encroachment into political governance (A. Shah, 2022).

This underlying instability culminated in the first direct military intervention in 1958, by General Ayub Khan, which formally established the political supremacy of the military and established a pattern of future rule. The ten years of dictatorship under Ayub (1958-1969) was not just a suspension of democracy but a deliberate attempt to establish top-down, politically sterile system of basic democracies to manage control but not the generation of political activity. This model was savagely perfected during the rule of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) to unite the military power with a specific form of political Islam to justify its rule and to systematize the legal and educational systems to establish a new ideological foundation of the state (H. Haqqani, 2022). The period of Zia was central to the entrenchment of military structures, both institutionally and economically, which was further stepped up by the military leadership of General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008), who both promoted a rhetoric of enlightened moderation and the proliferation of the use of intelligence agencies to control the political environment. All these long periods of dictatorship did not merely disrupt civilian government: they actually dissolved and restructured political parties, corrupted the judiciary, and raised a compliant breed of politician, so that even after their official departure, the political ecosystem was still essentially programmed to work within limits established by the military apparatus.

The post-dictatorial transitions were thus not restorations of the untrammelled democracy but rather, well-calculated procedures aimed at keeping the core interests of the military behind the guise of a civilian. The post-Zia period witnessed the development of a tripartite system of power sharing between the President, the Prime Minister, and the Army Chief by giving the military a formal veto. The after Musharraf period which started in 2008 was an advanced form of this hybridity. In this case, the military mostly disengaged with the daily affairs of the governing system, but maintained a monopoly of power over the high politics of foreign policy, national security and nuclear command with the art of political engineering also mastered to guarantee malleable civilian regimes (International Crisis Group, 2023). This includes the tactical application of coercion, patronage, and manipulation of the law to marginalize dissenting political players and promote cooperative ones, which is vividly demonstrated with the blatant pressure on governments and presumably the manipulation of party loyalties with establishment-based operations. Such controlled transitions have established a cyclic trend wherein the governance of civilians can be permissible, but not ruler of the state such that the

sovereignty of the people, albeit invoked ceremonially at the time of elections, is effectively castrated in the chamber of actual power.

Pillars of Pakistan's Contemporary Hybrid Regime

The most obvious component of the modern hybrid regime in Pakistan is the advanced political engineering apparatus that works to introduce a manageable outcomes of the electoral process instead of a free popular will. This transcends historical coup making to more subtle approach of influencing the political environment itself. The establishment, mainly via its intelligence agencies, has adopted the twin tactics of coercion and co-option whereby it marginalizes political elements that are perceived as a threat to its interests and encourages and promotes collapsible options. This was rudely illustrated before the 2018 general elections, when the court ordered the disqualification of some of the main political leaders on the grounds of pre-poll rigging, and at the same time emboldened defections to mainstream parties to establish a more advantageous electoral environment in favor of a candidate of choice (International Crisis Group, 2019). Most recently, the pressure on the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party after May 9, 2023, events, including the alleged forced resignations of party members, the formation of a new, establishment-approved faction, is a textbook example of dismantling a large political party to disempower its influence (BBC News, 2023). This unremitting control has ensured that no civilian government can have an undisputable mandate hence it is always at the mercy of tacit or overt protection by the military to survive.

This political manipulation is legalized in a second, vital pillar the constitutional and judicial interface. The high court, although at times claiming to be independent, has a recorded history of offering legal justification to military takeovers by means of the dubious doctrine of necessity, thus justifying coup after the fact. This influence is exercised in the modern age in a more subtle manner by influencing the perceived politicization of key judgments that are in line with the objectives of political engineering that the establishment aims to achieve. The Panama Papers Case in which the Supreme Court disqualified Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 2017 was widely viewed not only as a judicial act of accountability, but as a disruptive act that effectively disrupted a civilian government and changed the political course of the nation (H. Shah, 2022). Moreover, the control of judicial nomination, especially via agencies such as Judicial Commission of Pakistan has been a highly contentious issue with critics asserting that it guarantees a judiciary that is often inclined towards the state security narrative. This judicial complicity either by force or by consent offers a shroud of constitutional legitimacy to procedures that essentially erode the sovereignty of democracy and obscure the distinction between judicial adjudication and political execution.

The regime uses a powerful media management unit in order to tame the official discourse which engulfs this manufactured political and legal environment. This pillar functions based on an estimated combination of coercion and co-option, making sure that the dominating media discourses are congruous with the interests of the establishment. Coercive measures encompass direct censorship, forced disappearance of vocal journalists and indirect measures through manipulation of advertising revenues, which is a very crucial lifeline to media houses. To either impose a ban on certain content or suppress critical voices in the name of protecting national security or social order, media regulators like the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) are often invoked (Reporters Without Borders, 2023). At the same time, co-option is also attained through developing a group of patriotic journalists and analysts who can be confidently used to advance the preferred story, and they may be given special access to information and officials. This produces a cooling effect and an atmosphere of self-censorship whereby the limits of what can be discussed are strictly circumscribed by the public relations arm of the military that literally produces consent to the hybrid regime and silenced dissent as being unpatriotic or a danger to the state.

The military has a huge, vested economic empire, underpinning all other pillars and giving a strong material interest in preserving the political status quo. This empire has been documented by Ayesha Siddiqi as Milbus and includes a large web of business interests, including, but not limited to, gigantic real estate projects (e.g., DHA and Bahria Town), intricate industrial ownership in industries such as cement, fertilizers, and banking, and extensive infrastructure contracts (Siddiqi, 2021). This hegemony in the economy performs two important roles. Firstly, it offers colossal off-budget revenue streams that increase the institutional independence of the military to the control of civilian financial resources and makes it a state within a state. Second, it fosters a strong corporate lobby in the military that directly has a vested interest in political stability by the terms of its preferred access to resources and policy-making. Every step towards real civilian pre-eminence, along with the accountability and transparency which it would involve, would put these huge financial stakes directly at risk. Thus, the economic empire is not an incidental consequence of the political strength of the military, rather, it is one of the primary reasons why it has been consistently involved in politics such that the continuation of its corporate wellbeing is inseparable with the continuation of a hybrid system where it is able to veto at will.

Sovereignty Deficit in Pakistan

The most obvious symptom of the sovereignty deficit is the fact that elections have turned into the act of popular will to be turned into a complex tool of political management. It is a highly pre-poll engineered, post-poll engineered process of negating the real voter choice. The disqualification of threatening candidates (legal and extra-legal), the formation of political groups that are more establishment-friendly, and the overall climate of strategically-managed media discourse and campaign resources all point to pre-poll strategies used to tilt the scales towards the establishment. Observers of the 2018 general elections decried such pre-poll rigging, where one party was regarded to be fighting the election on a very uneven footing (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2018). Most recently, the political crackdown in the wake of the May 2023 unrest, which entailed mass arrests of party workers and the systematic disorganization of a large political party by pressure and defections, amounts to a fundamental pre-poll manipulation of the future election results prior to the casting of a single ballot (Hashim, 2023). This is an engineering that makes voting to be a ritual that sanctions a predetermined political order denying the electorate their sovereign right to make significant change via the ballot box and making the parliament a managed and not a mandated body of representatives.

This controlled election process has the natural effect of creating a subservient parliament thereby being left without real power to exercise sovereignty over the most important policy areas of the state. Whereas legislatures in mature democracies have the ultimate power over national policy, the Pakistan parliament is constrained by the active and passive veto of the military establishment. Fundamental concerns of national security, foreign policy in particular with United States, China and India and control over nuclear weapons and command and control systems are squarely in the domain of the military, virtually forming a state within a state. The supremacy of the military in these parameters is such that the military remains the dominant force, with civilian government's often mere observers when crucial national decisions need to be made, as scholar C. Christine Fair (2021) observes. As an example, the key diplomatic missions, or conflicts with neighbors, are often held by the public relations division of the military or its intelligence services and parliament is left to the post-facto debating society. This institutional castration of the legislature implies that in the event that a government should ever have a true mandate it will be constitutionally and practically bounded in its ability to exercise sovereign power, thus establishing an insurmountable divide between the rule of law and the reality of power.

The aggregate impact of such systematic manipulation is disastrous loss of popular confidence, and a further rift between the ideals of the Constitution and the reality of its working. The recurrent engineered election and crippled government has created a deep voter apathy and cynicism amongst the citizens who are increasingly becoming skeptical of the democratic process as a mere farce played by certain strong, unelected interest groups. This realization is not just anecdotal; it is borne out in the dwindling voter turnout in falsified constituencies and in the increasing national discussion about the futility of voting at all. This is a vicious circle: the lack of involvement of the people gives the establishment an extra excuse in which to control the political environment claiming that the politicians are corrupt and people are divided. In its turn, it makes the great promise of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973) that the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the elected representatives of the people an empty statement. The extra-constitutional power of the military establishment systematically neutralizes the sovereignty of the people vested in the highest legal document, a fact that demonstrates a basic truth: Pakistan is governed by a dual system of constitutional sovereignty to legitimacy and a de facto military governance, which is the main contradiction that lies at the very core of its current political crisis.

Conclusion

Finally, the hybrid democratic system in Pakistan is not a momentary thing but a complex and long-established form of government that aims at systematically disenfranchising the people. The discussion in this paper shows that such system is self-reinforcing, with a strong architecture. It supports the political engineering of electoral results, the legalization of establishment tastes in the judiciary, the authoritarian control of the popular discourse, the huge economic empire of the military service in a coordinated effort to establish a political reality in which the forms of democracy are carefully managed but its content is brutally stripped away. Elections are turned into controlled games, parliaments are turned into the society of debates over minor matters, and the trust people had is turned to cynical indifference. The outcome is a major lack of sovereignty, in which the constitutional statement that all power derives out of the people becomes a matter of legal fiction which hides the real power of an unelected military apparatus that regards itself as the final decision-maker of the national interest.

Thus, the fight over the democratic soul of Pakistan no longer concerns how to avoid another military coup, but rather concerns how to eliminate this institutionalized hybridity itself. The task of making a decisive shift to a regime of controlled civilian government to one of real civilian preeminence is the core problem, in which elected officials have free rein in all areas of state policy, including national security and foreign policy. The cycle of engineered democracies and lack of political development will continue unabated unless this basic rebalancing is undertaken. The way out will require a shared and bold initiative of democratic consolidation: empowering political parties internally, a national agreement on the sacrosanctity of the constitutional order, and empowering civil society and independent press to take back the public discourse. Finally, to fulfill the promise of the Pakistani constitution, the will of the people should be left to pull the final strings, not as a sham every five years, but as a time-honored and unquestioned principle that sets the paths of the nation.

References

- BBC News. (2023, June 22). *Pakistan: Imran Khan's PTI party members quit in 'mass exodus'*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65982145>
- Dahl, R. A. (1998). *On democracy*. Yale University Press.
- European Union Election Observation Mission. (2018). *Pakistan: Final report on the general elections*. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2018_-_pakistan_-_final_report_on_the_general_elections.pdf
- Fair, C. C. (2021). *In their own words: Understanding Pakistani support for militancy*. Oxford University Press.

- Haqqani, H. (2022). *Reimagining Pakistan: Transforming a dysfunctional state*. HarperCollins India.
- Hashim, A. (2023, June 22). *As Pakistan cracks down on Imran Khan's PTI, where do his supporters go?* Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/22/as-pakistan-cracks-down-on-imran-khans-pti-where-do-his-supporters-go>
- Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political order in changing societies*. Yale University Press.
- International Crisis Group. (2019, July 29). *Election and political reforms in Pakistan*. Asia Report No. 303. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/303-election-and-political-reforms-pakistan>
- International Crisis Group. (2023, February 15). *Averting a constitutional crisis in Pakistan*. Asia Report No. 325. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/325-averting-constitutional-crisis-pakistan>
- Jalal, A. (1995). *Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia: A comparative and historical perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
- Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). *Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge University Press.
- Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Nawaz, S. (2021). *Pakistan: The reality beyond the crisis*. Routledge.
- Pakistan Const. (1973).
- Perlmutter, A. (1974). The praetorian state and the praetorian army: Toward a taxonomy of civil-military relations in developing polities. *Comparative Politics*, 6(3), 382-404.
- Philip, G. (2021). *The politics of sovereignty*. Routledge.
- Reporters Without Borders. (2023). *2023 World Press Freedom Index – Pakistan*. <https://rsf.org/en/country/pakistan>
- Rizvi, H.-A. (2000). *The military and politics in Pakistan, 1947-1997*. Sang-e-Meel Publications.
- Shah, A. (2022). *The army and democracy: Military politics in Pakistan*. Harvard University Press.
- Shah, H. (2022). *The judicialization of politics in Pakistan: The Supreme Court in the spotlight*. Oxford University Press.
- Siddiq, A. (2017). *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's military economy* (2nd ed.). Pluto Press.
- Siddiq, A. (2021). *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's military economy* (2nd ed.). Pluto Press.
- Zaidi, S. A. (2021). *Making a sovereign state: The military and politics in Pakistan*. Cambridge University Press.