



Hegemonic Transition: How China and Russia are Changing Global Governance

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ABSTRACT

The study examines the evolution of the US led "rule-based" international order and its challenges posed by the emerging Sino-Russian alliance and the implications of a potential shift toward possible new world order characterized by state sovereignty, non-interference, and pragmatic cooperation through historical and contemporary case studies where it examines the strengths and criticisms of the US led order and the broader global implications for governance, authoritarianism, and international law. Historically framed as a system promoting democracy, human rights, and multilateralism, the current order reveals selective rule enforcement and inconsistent application of international norms, questioning its legitimacy. The Sino-Russian order emphasizes realpolitik and stability over ideological commitments, seeking to establish a multipolar world through initiatives like China's Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This research elucidates the distinctive feature of the Sino-Russian partnership and the challenges it presents to the entrenched US-led order and its allies. The evolving dynamics of Sino-Russian influence could redefine international norms, fostering an environment that prioritizes state sovereignty at the expense of individual rights, particularly affecting nations caught between US and Sino-Russian interests. Understanding these shifts is crucial for comprehending the future of international relations. The study will provide insights into how the Sino-Russian approach challenges global stability, regional alliances, and democratic values, while also examining the responses of US aligned nations to these developments, thereby offering a comprehensive analysis of the evolving geopolitical landscape.

Keywords: Hegemonic Transition, China, Russia, Global Governance.

Introduction

1. Introduction

To characterize the current global order as a 'rule based international order' is a misnomer since it is more of a system of international norms, agreements and institutions led and set up by the United States (US) after World War 2 but more so where laws are being bent to serve oneself interest. This has been a strong order which stresses multilateral collaboration, free commerce, human right, and support for democracy; the things closely tied to US's values and interests¹. Treaties and conventions try to make state behavior more predictable through agreements such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization and NATO which are key institutions to collaborate and resolve conflicts. Yet there has been resistance to that order, particularly from powers at the rise, like China and Russia, challenging its premiership and sanctions thud reigning its insufficiency in settling contemporary geopolitical tensions, and proposing more reciprocity world into which norms, with little enforcement, can be debated or redesigned.

2. Significance

The paper sheds light on the potential for China and Russia in the changing balance of power among nations and ability to disrupt the global order, changing long-standing ideas and norms such as multilateralism, human rights, and democracy in today's world.

This has important practical results for those aiming to build stable and cooperative international relationships considering the changing global governance framework.

3. Research objective

This research examines the process of shifting global power, with a particular interest in how US backed "rule-based" international order differs from the new system being built by China and Russia, by looking at the underlying features, assessing their impact on global rulemaking and considering what could happen next.

4. Research question

- What difference has the US led "rule-based" international order made in global governance and what are the main positives and negatives?
- How can this growing Sino-Russian alliance challenge the existing role played by the US, especially when it comes to national independence, working internationally and running economic systems?
- How the change from a US dominated system to one might led by China and Russia affect standard worldwide practices?

5. Core argument

US led approach to the international order has usually promoted democracy, human rights, and free markets, while prioritizing what helps the US, some question its honesty, while the growing Sino-Russian alliance puts state sovereignty and non-interference first.

6. The Current US-Led "Rule-Based" Order

The end of the Second World War marked the end of an era due to the fall of colonial powers. As a result, a new global system and a new world order came to existence where two alliances began to govern the world. One was a capitalist alliance led by the US and other was a communist alliance led by USSR. The new order under the US leadership had its focus making the world less prone to conflicts through international institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)². Institutions which offered the world a forum for global cooperation, a way to resolve disputes, and set the US firmly at the center of postwar world making.

The US led global order is governed on the ideological basis of liberal values of democratic governance, human rights and expansion of capitalist economies are carried as universal, as they are visible in US campaign for development efforts world over³. Its purpose is to give the world a system based on its own political and economic ideals, i.e., democracy, and free markets. But there is a huge question mark on its implementation method. Only selectively in global governance. At times they support authoritarian governments and those who have committed the worst form of human rights violation while asking others to implement reforms rather than seeing local context.

It is due to selective enforcement that it is facing criticism. One of the primary criticisms is its intervention policies. Many of these interventions and policies of the US in the world appear to give

¹ Brookings. (2023, April 18). *Democracy, human rights, and the emerging global order*. Brookings Institution. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/democracy-human-rights-and-the-emerging-global-order/>.

² World Economic Forum. (2018, April 10). *Measuring the value to the U.S. of the postwar international order*.

<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/measuring-the-value-to-the-us-of-the-postwar-international-order/>.

³ Congressional Research Service. (2023, May 31). *Artificial intelligence and national security* (R47890). <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47890>

more weight to their interests than that of global stability or genuine contribution to humanitarian goals. The 2003 Iraq War launched under the pretext of eliminating weapons of mass destruction and for promoting democracy, which has been much criticized for being more concerned with the US strategic and economic interests than humanitarian goals. Even though no weapons were found, an apology did not come. The main reasons were to keep the oil resources under control and improve US geopolitical influence in the Middle East. This hypocrisy, as perceived, has fueled growing discontent with US foreign policy that is biased and has double standards in enforcing its own rules when it comes to supporting authoritarian regimes. In common with the legacy of the Iraq War, USA interventions remain a subject of heated debate: many are suspicious of US claims to engage in the exercise of the boon of global stability and humanitarian values⁴. On other hand, the same USA did not intervene in Gaza for humanitarian purposes where humanitarian crisis⁵ is even worse.

The way the U.S. has led the economy since World War II is predicated on the key role of free markets in generating global prosperity. The foundation of the WTO model relies on international cooperation and help maintain trade, investment, and economic laws. Economic architecture supports growth by financial multinationals which rely on global networks and welcome free trade. The current trade policy emphasizes “friend-shoring” where nations pursue trade and investment agreements through the imposition of preferential tariffs⁶. Western economies, especially of the US, are built on military industrial complex and most aid is on the same grounds, but economies cannot be built on it during times when economies need rebuilding.

7. The alternative order

The post-Cold War era saw a completely different spectrum at the international stage, US being a sole power focused on maintaining status quo and engaged in endless wars in Europe, Middle East that saw focused shift from potential emerging rivals⁷ which has allowed its rivals to gain space in the international stage. Since 2001 after the start of war on terror and Chinese ascension to world trade organization and its subsequent rise along with Russia, the global geopolitical forum has changed with both China and Russia has emerged as a major player in this global political space. Both found common ground in their shared opposition to Western dominance in international institutions and other domains of development and established a strategic partnership which led to cooperation agreements and challenged US-led international ‘rule based’ order. This is a stark contrast opposite to significant rift during the cold war due to their different approaches to modernization. The growing skepticism toward Western interventionism, along with decline of US influence and their shared economic and geopolitical interests ha. led to the emergence of a Sino-Russian alliance aimed at reshaping the global order whose basis are in 1997 signing of memorandum of understanding between the two.

The Sino-Russian alliance has emerged as an alternative to the global power whose ideas are built on state sovereignty, non-

intervention, pragmatic cooperation whereas historically world has witnessed USA attempts to shape global governance by alliances and institutions that legitimize democratic ideals and market economies. The dialogue over the future of global governance and whether there could be a Sino-Russian led order that is competitive with the current Western dominated system has also grown.

The rising alliance between China and Russia mirrors the strength of their mutual interest in redefining the existing US-led order. The two governments’ origins in opposition to what they see as Western dominance in international institutions and their willingness to establish a multipolar world in which their emerging power-led countries have greater influence goes back to the 1997 MoU⁸. China’s BRI and Russia’s vast exports-based energy reserves which as intricately linked to each other have together brought their interests closer economically; military cooperation, including the joint exercises and arms trade, characterizes their increasing level of security association⁹. The potential new order will be slightly different than the old one which will come in place by the action on MoU.

Permanent 5 or P5 countries tend to use their veto power to fuel deadlock and protecting the geopolitical interests allies or themselves at the expense of global peace and security¹⁰ and Sino-Russian alliance too use it to counter Western initiatives of the global governance international stage such as the United Nations Security Council, when there is an interest in bankrolling measures that might undermine their interests like they have extensively used in Syrian case. This relationship holds the promise of transforming the international order away from the US centric status quo towards a different paradigm based on respect to state sovereignty, the non-interference and setting regional spheres of influence.

At the core of the Sino-Russian vision for global governance is a rejection of the Western focus on universal values like democracy and human rights. Instead, both nations advocate an international system a strong commitment to the principle of non-interference¹¹ in the domestic affairs of sovereign states is at the core of the Sino-Russian approach to global governance. Both China and Russia have proven through partnerships in Europe and elsewhere that system in place of country doesn’t needs to change as per their system through alliances formed and they emphasize on upholding state sovereignty as inviolable, allowing governments to determine their own political and economic systems without external pressure, opposing any form of pressure aimed at altering a country’s internal political structure. This stance contrasts with the Western model, which often promotes and demands democracy but in selective ones and regime change¹² operations under the banner of supporting human rights. This principle has resonated with many governments, particularly in the Global South, who view it as a safeguard against Western interventionism which allows China and Russia to form relationships with a variety of regimes whether democratic or authoritarian without imposing conditions related to governance or human rights, thereby expanding their influence among states wary of Western-style diplomacy. Instead, Sino-Russian block draws a red line

⁴ Pew Research Center. (2023, March 14). *A look back at how fear and false beliefs bolstered U.S. public support for war in Iraq*. <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/03/14/a-look-back-at-how-fear-and-false-beliefs-bolstered-u-s-public-support-for-war-in-iraq/>.

⁵ United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). (2025, April 24). *UNRWA situation report #168 on the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem*. <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-168-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem>

⁶ Chivvis, C. S., & Kapstein, E. B. (2022, April 28). *U.S. strategy and economic statecraft: Understanding the tradeoffs*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/04/us-strategy-and-economic-statecraft-understanding-the-tradeoffs?lang=en>

⁷ Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, "The 'New World Order': An Outline of the Post-Cold War Era," *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 43-54, <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/19517>.

⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2000, November 15). *Sino-Russian joint statement*. http://fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367077.html

⁹ Christoffersen, S. (2024, October 31). *China's aid in the Ukraine war*. Harvard International Review. <https://hir.harvard.edu/chinas-aid-in-the-ukraine-war/>.

¹⁰ Better World Campaign. (2025, February 9). *UN explained: The history of the United Nations Security Council veto*. <https://betterworldcampaign.org/peace-and-security-issues/un-explained-the-history-of-the-united-nations-security-council-veto>

¹¹ Li, J. (2019). *Conflict mediation with Chinese characteristics: How China justifies its non-interference policy as an arbitrator*. Stimson Center. <https://www.stimson.org/2019/conflict-mediation-chinese-characteristics-how-china-justifies-its-non-interference-policy/>.

¹² DeVos, M. (2021, June 21). *Regime change?* Youth Institute for Policy. <https://yipinstitute.org/article/regime-change>

based on security interests when crossed they retaliate like in Ukraine or south China sea.

China and Russia are also outspoken critics of Western interventions¹³, particularly those justified on humanitarian grounds or under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. They argue that such interventions are often used as pretexts for advancing geopolitical interests, leading to regional destabilization and violations of state sovereignty. High-profile examples such as NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 are cited as cases where Western powers used the rhetoric of human rights, threat to the world safety and democracy promotion to justify actions that ultimately resulted in chaos and regime collapse. But China and Russia have been accused of taking an approach to R2P that is instrumental and at odds with international understandings of the doctrine. For example, they vetoed a UNSC resolution on potential sanctions on Syria's Assad government in June 2012, drawing criticism from American and British officials. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its defense of the 2008 Georgian War as a responsibility to protect Russian citizens outside of Russia have also faced scrutiny.¹⁴ From the Sino-Russian perspective, these actions of west reveal the double standards as their stance on similar issues are different, which selectively applies principles like sovereignty and non-interference based on its strategic interests. Both China and Russia actively advocate for diplomatic solutions to conflicts through multilateral platforms like the United Nations and emphasize respect for each nation's right to govern its own internal affairs. This critique of Western interventionism is consistent with their broader goal of promoting such global governance model that respect state sovereignty and rejects what they perceive as neocolonial interference by the West.

In the era of geo-economics, China's mega-infrastructure project BRI¹⁵ launched in 2013, aims to develop two new trade routes connecting China to the rest of world, deepening China's economic ties with Asia, Africa, and Europe and expands its influence. This initiative is complemented by cooperation with Russia, where Russia's energy exports and China's investment in energy infrastructure is a key economic dimension of the partnership. Under BRI, China hands out unconditional loans which are great asset for poor nations. Additionally, China and Russia are strengthening partnership by their participation in alternative regional and international organizations like the SCO and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and south Africa) as platforms for economic and political collaboration, directly challenging Western-dominated frameworks. They provide platforms for China who leads them and Russia to coordinate policies and advance their combine vision of a multipolar world and act as alternatives to Western-led organizations like NATO and the G7, offering different pathways for economic and political collaboration. They are also working on a parallel system of transactions to challenge SWIFT, a centralized system to ensure international transactions¹⁶. Leveraging their geographical advantage and complementary resources, the two countries aim to expand their influence and build resilience against Western economic pressure, presenting a coherent alternative to the current international order.

Also, China and Russia do not pressure other countries to pursue regime change or democratization. Unlike Western nations, which frequently tie aid or cooperation to democratic reforms, China and Russia prioritize stability and sovereignty in their foreign relations. This approach allows them to form partnerships with a broader range of countries, including authoritarian regimes that might otherwise be sidelined by Western powers.

Whatever the west has done since the end of the cold war, no excuses can justify it unless prosecution of war crimes is done. Emerging economies are justified in their criticism of the west's actions. Both China and Russia frequently criticize Western interventions, particularly those done in the name of humanitarian efforts, arguing that such actions often serve ulterior motives rather than genuine concern for human rights or global stability. For example, they argue that interventions in countries like Libya and Iraq were conducted under the guise of protecting civilians and promoting democracy but instead resulted in prolonged chaos, loss of life, and a power vacuum that allowed extremist groups to flourish. From the Sino-Russian perspective, these interventions represent a form of neocolonialism, where powerful Western nations impose their values and political systems on weaker states, undermining sovereignty, and exacerbating conflicts. This critique resonates with various governments, especially in the Global South, which are wary of Western influence and interventionism. In contrast, China and Russia promote their own approach to global governance, which emphasizes respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, positioning themselves as defenders of a multipolar world that rejects unilateral interventions¹⁷.

8. Key Characteristics

8.1. Us led order.

The US order is built upon a rule-based system that emphasizes adherence to international norms and rules, which are designed to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law across the globe. This foundation creates a framework in which countries are expected to operate within established guidelines that prioritize the dignity and rights of individuals. Through institutions such as the United Nations and various treaties, the US seeks to foster a global environment that supports democratic governance and accountability, often championing values that align with its own political ideology¹⁸.

To uphold this system, the US engages in interventionist policies that include military interventions and economic sanctions aimed at promoting democratic governance and protecting human rights in other countries. These actions are frequently framed as moral imperatives, where the US perceives itself as a guardian of global democracy, willing to act unilaterally or multilaterally to address perceived threats to freedom and justice. However, such interventions are often criticized for being selective and inconsistent, as they may prioritize US strategic interests or geopolitical considerations over genuine humanitarian concerns¹⁹.

A crucial element of the US led order is the establishment and maintenance of strong alliance networks, exemplified by organizations like NATO that are intended to enhance collective security and deter potential threats from adversarial states. The US

¹³ Snetkov, Aglaya, and Marc Lanteigne. 2015. "International Relations of the Asia-Pacific." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 15, no. 1 (January): 113–46. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcu018>.

¹⁴ Rae, Heather, and Phil Orchard. 2016. "Russia and the Responsibility to Protect." *R2P Ideas in Brief*, AP R2P Brief 6, no. 1. University of Queensland. https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/3038/r2pbrief_2016_russia_and_r2p.pdf.

¹⁵ Yu, J., & Wallace, J. (2021, September 13). *China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)*. Chatham House. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri>

¹⁶ Yilmaz, M. E. (2008). The "new world order": An outline of the post-Cold War era. *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 7(4), 43–54. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/19517>

¹⁷ Zaineldine, Ayman. "The West's Stigma and Why It Loses Global Support by Its Own Actions." *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs*.

<https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/the-wests-stigma-and-why-it-loses-global-support-by-its-own-actions/>.

¹⁸ Dugard, J. (2023). The choice before us: International law or a 'rules-based international order'? *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 36(2).

<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/choice-before-us-international-law-or-a-rulesbased-international-order/7BEDE2312FDF9D6225E16988FD18BAF0>.

¹⁹ Lehne, S. (2024, September 18). *The rules-based order vs. the defense of democracy*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

<https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/09/rules-based-order-vs-the-defense-of-democracy?lang=en¢er=europe>

often ties security assistance and military support to political reforms within allied nations, advocating for governance models that reflect Western democratic values. This strategy aims to create a unified front against common threats, while also promoting stability and democratic practices among partner countries.

Additionally, the US emphasizes the promotion of free markets and economic liberalism as key components of its global strategy. By advocating for free trade agreements and open markets, the US seeks to enhance economic cooperation and interdependence among nations, which it views as essential for fostering peace and prosperity. This approach aligns with Western economic interests, often prioritizing the expansion of US multinational corporations and ensuring favorable conditions for American businesses abroad. By championing these economic policies, the US aims to establish a global economic order that reflects its values and interests, reinforcing its leadership position on the world stage.

8.2. Sino-Russian led order

The Sino-Russian led order is defined by a pragmatic approach that emphasizes realpolitik over ideological considerations that states its focus on power dynamics, where mutual respect for state sovereignty and national interests takes precedence over the promotion of specific political ideologies. Both China and Russia prioritize stability and security in their international relationships, often engaging with a variety of regimes, regardless of their governance style, if these relationships serve their strategic interests. This approach contrasts sharply with the Western emphasis on democracy and human rights, allowing China and Russia to build alliances that reflect a shared commitment to maintaining control and resisting external pressures²⁰.

A significant component of this new order is economic multipolarity, prominently highlighted by China's BRI, serving as a central tool for reshaping global trade and infrastructure development, facilitating investments that enhance connectivity between Asia, Europe, and Africa through this which China not only seeks to expand its economic influence but also to establish a network of interdependence among participating countries. This strategy encourages the development of regional economic blocks, which serve as alternatives to traditional global institutions which impose such limitations and policies that align with west not local values like the WTO and world bank (WB). By fostering these regional partnerships, China and Russia aim to create a more diversified economic landscape that reduces reliance on Western-led systems and promotes a multipolar world.

Moreover, the Sino-Russian approach includes a potential for stronger relations with authoritarian regimes, mirroring the internal governance structures of both nations. This accommodation is rooted in a shared understanding of the challenges posed by Western interventionism and the promotion of democracy. By supporting authoritarian governments, China and Russia reinforce their positions as defenders of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. They prioritize stability and order over the promotion of democratic ideals, thus providing a framework that allows these regimes to operate without fear of external pressure for political reform. This alignment not only strengthens bilateral relations but also creates a support network among states that share similar governance philosophies, further

entrenching a global order that challenges the existing US led framework²¹.

Chinese partnership prioritizes economic partnership, and it display its economic prowess. Its partnerships on an economic basis have helped in rewriting existing alliances on a military basis and have weakened them too.

8.2.1. Chinese hesitancy in taking leadership.

This hesitance to take a front-line position in international organizations stems from a strong conviction that domestic stability is of paramount priority and China's refusal to adopt a reactive and passive approach to international affairs relies on the principle of social harmony and economic growth²². China put itself in the line of global south states and call itself as developing nation. Traditionally, China has preferred not to destroy the wheel but rather reform it from within, or to support it if it is on firm ground. With a robust economic foundation, a colossal market, and a comprehensive industrial ecosystem, China stands resilient²³ enough to withstand global shocks.

China strategically prioritizes the development of its economic influence before fully embracing political leadership. Initiatives like the BRI aim to create a solid foundation for its global standing. This gradual approach ensures its influence is built on a stable economic base, minimizing potential backlash and fostering relationships. China's hesitation to confront the US directly reflects a nuanced strategy of balancing competition with cooperation, allowing it to expand its influence²⁴.

Concerns over global responsibility also weigh heavily on China's leadership ambitions as it is wary of being burdened with the same global responsibilities that the US has traditionally managed, such as security commitments and crisis intervention. Taking on these roles could expose China to international criticism and conflict, potentially destabilizing its domestic situation and diverting attention from economic development. China often emphasizes principles of non-interference and sovereignty, advocating for a multipolar world order where responsibilities are shared. This desire to avoid overextending itself is reflected in its approach to international crises, where it often opts for diplomatic solutions rather than military interventions, demonstrating its reluctance to take on the burdens of global leadership that could threaten its stability²⁵.

9. Research gap

While a great deal has been written on the international order started by the US following WWII, not much work has focused on how a Sino-Russian order might work. The research targets this issue by exploring how each global order is different and what implications they may have for global governance, as while studies have mainly examined US rules or the policies of China and Russia independently, few have looked at China and Russia working together to compete with US global dominance.

10. Theoretical framework

Using a constructivist framework, this work will examine the influence of ideas, identities, and norms on relations among states and international order, focusing on the contest and development of US led order and the intentions of the Sino-Russian alliance to reshape global governance goals. It reveals that the mutually

²⁰ Thondup, K. (2024, June 30). *China-Russia alignment is a pragmatic association*. Sunday Guardian Live. <https://sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/china-russia-alignment-is-a-pragmatic-association>.

²¹ Weitz, R. (2024, March 7). *A view from Russia on Sino-Russian relations in 2023–24*. Hudson Institute. <https://theasanforum.org/a-view-from-russia-on-sino-russian-relations-in-2023-24/>.

²² The Friday Times. (2024, December 14). *China's quest for global leadership and the obstacles*. <https://thefridaytimes.com/14-Dec-2024/china-s-quest-for-global-leadership-and-the-obstacles>

²³ He, Y. (2025, January 23). *Chinese economy demonstrates precious resilience*. People's Daily. <https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/0123/c90000-20269537.html#:~:text=China's%20endeavor%20to%20promote%20high,and%20opportunities%20to%20the%20world>.

²⁴ Hodzi, O., & Chen, Y.-W. (2018). Following the flow: China's approach to global leadership. *East Asian Policy*, 10(04), 41–55. <https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740018500045>.

²⁵ Bhaya, A. G. (2023, December 16). From tradition to triumph: China's path to modernization and global leadership. *Modern Diplomacy*. <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/12/16/from-tradition-to-triumph-chinas-path-to-modernization-and-global-leadership/>

beneficial relations between China and Russia lead to recent changes in the structure of global politics. Its main concern lies in social influences and realistic aspects like state leadership and how countries' economic situations are linked which all play parts in guiding the policies and actions of nations. It will help us consider why China and Russia's strategies challenge the principles and rules that support US led system. Comparing Sino-Russian rule to Western liberalism, this study evaluates the way state power and human rights are addressed when ideological views clash. Additionally, the framework will consider how regional economic blocs play important roles in forming these developments, helping to make sense of the flows of power in a multipolar world.

11. Application

To show how US led order, and the Sino-Russian alliance are different, the research will use key case studies, including the Iraq War which demonstrates flawed enforcement of select rules by the US. US sanctions on Iran and Venezuela; and the BRI which reveals Chinese influence. This research analyzes these examples to learn how multiple governance models contribute to global stability, the rights of people and the acceptance of international law. The implications of these trends for Global South countries and their interactions with both the US and Russia will also be explored. The information will be used in a wide range of fields. Thanks to the study's findings, governments and policymakers can better handle international challenges as they watch the influence of the Sino-Russian partnership. Looking at the Sino-Russian order will help international organizations adjust their strategies to handle the changes in global power. In addition, this study will help improve international relations research by analyzing in detail what a Sino-Russian-led world would mean, compared to one ruled by the US, since this comparison is still missing from the existing theoretical literature. Using the theoretical framework, the analysis will evaluate China and Russia's geopolitical approaches and their impacts on rules set at the global level, studying how countries adjust to Chinese and Russian prominence in economic and human rights fields. It will investigate what steps the US and its allies must take and then spearhead strategies to strengthen international bodies and preserve the rights of both states and individuals.

12. Research methodology

To understand the changes happening because of the Sino-Russian alliance and the US led order, the research will use qualitative methods that involve case studies, policy reviews and studying texts—using government documents, policy statements, speeches and reports from multilateral gatherings as the main data, as well as scholarly articles, books and the work of subject-matter experts as secondary sources. Also, the study will look at cases studies to demonstrate the workings of the Sino-Russian order and how things such as the BRI and the reactions from countries working with the US are related. The objective is to understand the complex and shifting features of the world today and what problems and openings appear for governance.

13. Analysis

In history, the US led system operated selectively, and this was demonstrated during the 2003 Iraq War meant to remove weapons of mass destruction and set up democracy but later judged as not legitimate and causing regional unrest. In the same way, imposing sanctions on Iran and Venezuela, but not on Israel or Saudi Arab has been seen as giving priority to American strategy and rarely helping civilians despite not having the intended results on politics. Because the US does not always obey

international rules, some people find its foreign policy hypocritical. While building these alliances globally, the US depends on NATO to keep the rules of the international system intact. Thanks to NATO, European countries feel safer from Russia, but each state still needs to find ways to balance its regional and political goals. Moreover, because US alliances go from Europe to the Asia-Pacific, they constantly challenge the military and the economy and lead to regional disputes.

At the same time, the stronger cooperation between China and Russia gives an alternative to the US led order by emphasizing respect for the nation, refraining from interfering, and working together realistically. Using the Belt and Road Initiative, China and Russia have increased their economic reach by building highways, railways, communication facilities and power stations in Asia, Africa and Europe, relying on the renewed dependencies to influence countries economically and diplomatically and to increase their strength without influencing designs of each country's domestic politics. They are also closely aligned because they both stand against Western countries trying to influence events around the world.

In contrast to America, China and Russia give importance to non-interference, making their alliance attractive to most undemocratic regimes because it bypasses the usual political conditions connected to Western development assistance. This model is meaningful for Global South countries and similar regions uneasy about direct US influence, as it focuses on links beyond political change. Besides, China and Russia have focused on building close ties with authoritarian regimes, choosing partners who value each other's sovereignty. Authoritarian stability is a fundamental problem for the Western model of governance, as it could move the world's balance of power toward a greater number of powerful, less democratic states.

14. Geographical perspective

14.1. Sino- Russian led order

The geographical advantages of the Sino-Russian alliance are a key factor in their deepening strategic partnership. Their shared land border and proximity allow for easier economic and military collaboration, facilitating the swift deployment of resources and personnel when necessary, enhancing both nations' ability to conduct joint military exercises, share intelligence, and coordinate responses to potential security threats, all without the logistical challenges faced by more geographically distant alliances. The collaboration benefits from Russia's significant landmass, which not only provides military advantages but also enables China to secure overland access to critical trade routes and resources, fostering greater interdependence between the two powers.²⁶

BRI is a prime example of ways geography strengthens Sino-Russian ties through which China has initiated vast infrastructure projects that extend across Asia, Europe, and even Africa, using Russia's geographical position as a critical transit point. Russia's vast territory and resources make it an essential partner in this initiative, facilitating the movement of goods across borders and enabling China to solidify its influence in regions where Russian infrastructure plays a vital role. In this sense, Russia serves as a gateway for China's global economic ambitions, providing the necessary land connections and logistical support to expand its economic footprint across Eurasia²⁷. Climate change has helped Russia unearth northern sea route as an alternative trade route between east Asia and Europe which is being explored²⁸ and developed.

²⁶Weitz, R. (2024, March 7). *A view from Russia on Sino-Russian relations in 2023–24*. The Asan Forum. <https://theasanforum.org/a-view-from-russia-on-sino-russian-relations-in-2023-24/>.

²⁷Gondal, A. A. (2022, August 22). *China's strategic interests in the Arctic & Sino-Russian cooperation*. Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research.

<https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/politics-governance/chinas-strategic-interests-in-the-arctic-sino-russian-cooperation/>

²⁸Pradhan, R. P. (2025, May 7). The northern sea route emerges as a climate-friendly trade corridor. *Daily Pioneer*. <https://www.dailypioneer.com/2025/columnists/the-northern-sea-route-emerges-as-a-climate-friendly-trade-corridor.html>

Another geographical advantage of the Sino-Russian alliance is resource access²⁹. Russia possesses abundant reserves of oil, natural gas, minerals, and other resources, which are essential to China's energy security and economic growth. Through their partnership, China gains access to these resources at favorable terms, ensuring a steady supply of critical materials. In return, Russia benefits from significant Chinese investments in its energy and infrastructure sectors, creating a mutually beneficial economic framework that reinforces their geopolitical partnership. Their partnership extends to defense domain too.

14.2. US-led order

In contrast, the US led order faces several geographical disadvantages. One of the primary challenges is the scattered nature of its global alliance network. While the US maintains a wide array of allies across different continents, this geographical dispersion makes it difficult to coordinate defense and diplomatic efforts efficiently. Allied nations are often separated by vast distances, which complicates military planning, especially in times of crisis when rapid response capabilities are essential. The sheer distance between allies means that coordinating collective action can be slower and less effective than in more geographically cohesive alliances like Sino-Russian cooperation.

The US' reliance on long supply lines for military operations adds another layer of complexity. Maintaining bases and supply routes across oceans requires substantial logistical planning and resources, leaving supply lines vulnerable to disruptions, especially during conflicts. Naval supply chains, airlift capabilities, and distant military outposts require extensive maintenance, which can become costly and inefficient during sustained military engagements. This challenge is particularly pronounced when operating in contested or hostile regions where supply lines are at risk of being intercepted or delayed, reducing the overall effectiveness of US military operations³⁰. Geographic disruption is also a threat to safe and secure resource access too.

Finally, the diverse interests of US allies can hinder the cohesiveness of its global order. While the US has allies in every corner of the world, these nations often have differing regional priorities due to differing regional dynamics and culture, security concerns, and economic interests which can complicate decision-making and reduce the effectiveness of collective responses to crises, as US allies may not always align with Washington's strategic objectives. Disparities in threat perception—such as European concerns over Russia and China versus those of Asia—can dilute the unified action that the US seeks to promote within its alliance system, further complicating its ability to project power and enforce its rule-based order globally³¹. Even Europe an iron clad ally of US has diverse interest when it comes to dealing Russia or China.

15. How Sino-Russian Order Would Differ from US-Led Order?

The emerging global order shaped by the Sino-Russian partnership reflects an increased tolerance of authoritarianism, characterized by a lack of universal promotion of democracy and human rights and its approach is more pragmatic, focusing on state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs which unlike the US-led order who often ties international engagement to the promotion of democratic values. Cooperation in this order with other regimes, including authoritarian governments, is determined by strategic interests rather than value-based judgments, allowing them to form alliances with states that share

similar governance models or that are seeking alternatives to Western pressure for political reform which fosters a more flexible and opportunistic global dynamic, where ideological alignment is less important than mutual benefit.

This shift is also reflected in shifting international law which promoted by the US and by Sino-Russia differs widely in interpretation. The US usually calls for an international system guided by liberal democratic standards, valuing human rights, humanitarian help, and agreements among several nations—but its critics suggest that these standards are often applied only when these help US interests. Meanwhile, A significant aspect of this shift is the potential de-emphasis on current international norms that are seen as infringing on state sovereignty, such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. R2P, which justifies international intervention to prevent human rights abuses. As a result, the US faces opposition from China and Russia who say that US intervention is against the principle of national sovereignty and is often criticized by China and Russia as a cover for Western interventionism. The Sino-Russian bloc is concerned with keeping countries independent and setting aside interference—even in emergency situations. Under the Sino-Russian strategies it prioritizes the inviolability of state sovereignty, advocating for a world order where countries are free from external interference, particularly in their internal governance. This might lead to a weakening of global humanitarian norms and a focus on regional laws and agreements that respect national interests over universal principles. Such agreements reflect the priorities of states seeking to protect their sovereignty and resist external pressures for democratization or human rights reforms. The concept of sanctions will be an ineffective concept.

When liberal democracy and pragmatic authoritarianism come into contact on a world scale, confrontations are likely to grow. Although everyone can agree by creating institutions and balancing powers in regions, there is also the possibility of disagreements over cyber governance, security beliefs and international human rights rules.

Economically, this new order places greater emphasis on state-driven models of economic cooperation and development, moving away from the traditionally promoted by Western institutions. China has been championing alternative economic structures, such as the SCO and BRI, which allow states to collaborate without adhering to the stringent conditions often imposed by Western-led financial organizations. SCO serves as a platform for regional cooperation that emphasizes security, economic collaboration, and cultural exchanges, while avoiding issues related to governance or political reform.

The decentralization of global financial governance by fostering cooperation through the alternative organizations represents a challenge to the dominance of Western financial institutions. China and Russia are promoting a model of economic engagement that is less dependent on Western financial systems and more aligned with state-led development strategies. This model appeals to many developing countries that are wary of the economic and political conditions attached to loans and assistance from Western institutions in this evolving global financial order where the focus is on sovereignty, economic self-determination, and regional cooperation, marking a significant departure from the centralized, Western-led systems that have traditionally shaped global economic governance. The new system will focus on regionalism.

²⁹ Fong, C., & Maizland, L. (2024, March 20). *China and Russia: Exploring ties between two authoritarian powers*. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-russia-relationship-xi-putin-taiwan-ukraine>

³⁰ Gracia Santos, M., & Olivie, I. (2024, February 16). *Tracking alliances in a fragmented and geopolitical world: The US according to Elcano Global Presence Index*. Elcano Royal Institute.

<https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/tracking-alliances-in-a-fragmented-and-geopolitical-world-the-us-according-to-elcano-global-presence-index/>

³¹ Ford, L. W., & Goldgeier, J. (2021, January 25). *Retooling America's alliances to manage the China challenge*. Brookings Institution. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/retooling-americas-alliances-to-manage-the-china-challenge/>

16. Economic warfare

The world order has seen a dramatic shift since late 2000s. In last 10 years it has been on a shaky ground that any misstep could lead to disaster. The rise of right-wing populist parties against whom west fought and sought protection deeming it a threat has put global order in jeopardy. Current period has eerie similarity to the period of 1930s. Movement of Trump and its agenda if fulfilled can have consequences which can undo globalized order and post war order. The first term was calm, but the second term is full of shocks aftershocks on markets. The tariffs imposed, which were higher than 1930 tariffs during great depression³², can result in recession, disruption of supply chains if it came into effect. Currently they are suspended. Tariffs on friends and foes alike have shaken the order. US is pursuing protectionism and its allies are finding ways to tariff proof their economies. Counter measures can result in another protectionism and the WTO's effectiveness will end if it fails to intervene and persuade countries not to pursue such policies. Policies whose end were sought by forming such organizations.

The tendency of America to tilt towards a nationalistic and protectionist policy in recent years is reminiscent of America turning back from the very basis of order that it formed in the post war period. Like in 1930s where it raised tariffs on imported goods in a bid to protect American farmers and industries, currently the same thing is happening.

Many of the countries affected hit back with retaliatory tariffs on US goods, delivering a severe blow to international trade, as well as domestic production and consumption. The impact resulted in World War II. Now countries retaliated³³ before suspension and some tried negotiating with Trumps to prevent similar effects. Main target was China who did not back down or approached to negotiate but retaliated while looking to approach badly hit countries to present itself as savior. Countries are losing faith in American leadership and in such scenario, it is China who is providing itself as alternative. Missing on the list of tariffs was Russia with whom Trump is looking for a reset³⁴. US is looking to forge alliance with Russia to counter China. With US taking back seat for the time being and China getting on the driver's seat slowly and slowly, the world order is shifting and its tilting towards China camp.

17. Challenges

17.1. Existing order

The existing order currently faces several challenges. The inability of leaders to deliver has caused the rise of nationalist governments and populist ones. These are against the norms on which US led order is formed. Potential threats of populism for democracy, such as its contribution to extreme majoritarianism, which challenges both political pluralism and party-democracy, the undermining of civil society, and the refusal to recognize opponents' democratic legitimacy as well as institutional checks and balances³⁵. The opposition voices and critical opinions are key in democratic societies to see one's governance success or where it is lacking. In

Europe, such parties are getting an increased voter bank with each passing election. The elected governments are increasingly becoming authoritarian by enacting laws aimed at curbing free speech in the name of national security.

US led order was entirely built on the principle of cooperation and they did many programs on such a basis. In recent years mistrust is increasingly becoming public and unilateral decisions by the US pushing allies away as it threatens allies' economies, their defense partnerships and even their sovereignty. They are negotiating separately from the US to minimize the pain from blow after blow and are pushing back³⁶. Preparing for intimidation to be a lasting feature of US relations which was part of our policy and now used on allies, they are trying to go their own way. This is fracturing the existing alliances. US is no longer willing to take security responsibility of Europe which is key element under NATO and has announced the creation of a "division of labor" where Europe takes "responsibility for its own security"³⁷. This move also gives way to regionalism from the globalized system.

The rise of regional powers is an opportunity for a new era of prosperity and constructive problem solving. The fluidity and adaptability with which the US seeks to work with the regional powers in addition to traditional treaty allies. But the strategic competition poses great challenges for regional states in balancing their acts towards major competitors; engagement with the US and China is often described as a choice between 'band wagoning' and 'balancing.' Having levelled relations with both the US and China, regional powers can afford better opportunities to bind both superpowers to the rules. Regional powers, in view of their 'greater status,' are expected to be more responsible; need to look into internal and external alleged poor policies impacting their regional ambitions like India, an aspiring regional power, needs to act more responsible/ rational with its neighbors, who repudiate Indian policies in the region. Primarily, economic partnerships and asymmetric challenges have brought the world closer together and made it interdependent, entailing mutual action by different powers³⁸.

Global south is tired of the endless lectures from the West about values and norms, especially when the West itself follows these principles selectively, only when it benefits them. So, it is a reality that the west is waking up to that the world is no longer hierarchical. With the rise of multipolarity, it is becoming more balanced and equal. A world that functions according to rules based on universality, applied equally to all, and enforced everywhere³⁹.

The West does not have the option of giving economic benefits to the global south whose economies are devastated by conflicts and need rebuilding. Security purpose aid cannot help in rebuilding economies. They need to sort out such problem otherwise China has presented itself as reliable economic partner through BRI.

17.2. Sino-Russian Order

The Sino-Russian alliance is a presence that poses a daunting challenge to the world order led by the United States, but it also

³² Bicer, A. (2025, April 8). History repeats? Trump tariffs draw parallels to Great Depression-era Smoot-Hawley Act. *Anadolu Agency*.

<https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/history-repeats-trump-tariffs-draw-parallels-to-great-depression-era-smoot-hawley-act/3531784>

³³ Tompkins, T. (2025, April 9). Which countries are retaliating, and which are negotiating Trump's tariffs? *Investopedia*. <https://www.investopedia.com/which-countries-are-retaliating-and-which-are-negotiating-trump-s-tariffs-update-11711796>

³⁴ Lucas, E. (2025, May 9). What a Trump reset with Russia could look like. *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/05/09/trump-putin-us-russia-reset-nato-eu-europe-ukraine-war/>

³⁵ Pintsch, A., Hammerschmidt, D., & Meyer, C. (2022). Introduction: The decline of democracy and rise of populism in Europe and their effect on democracy promotion. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 35(3), 405–423. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2022.2082797>

³⁶ Cave, D. (2025, March 31). *How Trump supercharged distrust, driving U.S. allies away*. *The New York Times*.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/31/world/trump-foreign-policy-trust.html>

³⁷ Bergmann, M. (2025, February 14). *The transatlantic alliance in the age of Trump: The coming collisions*. Center for Strategic and International Studies.

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/transatlantic-alliance-age-trump-coming-collisions>

³⁸ Ehtisham, K. (2023, February 24). *The role of regional powers in the contemporary complex geo-political environment*. Combined Strategic Analysis Group (CSAG), U.S. Central Command. https://nesa-center.org/dev/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/2023-0224_The-Role-of-Regional-Powers-in-the-Contemporary-Complex-Geo-Political-Environment.pdf

³⁹ Preiherman, Y. (2024, November 25). *Evolution of Western approaches towards multipolarity*. Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations. <https://minskdialogue.by/en/research/opinions/evolution-of-western-approaches-towards-multipolarity>

has its inner contradictions. At the same time, the opposing interests of China and of Russia are among the most important ones, particularly in the zones of Central Asia. For both powers, Central Asia is a strategic region for its means: Russia as part of its traditional sphere of influence and principal regional power, China as part of its BRI to expand beyond and its need for accessing energy and trade routes. These similar interests are a source of competition or friction between the two powers as China's economic might grows while threatening to eclipse Russia's political sway in Central Asia. While both refrain from pursuing interference and preferring pragmatic cooperation, tensions persist under the surface that the power of one over the other in this important region will be who has the upper hand⁴⁰.

Difference between China and Russia also comes from economic development strategies. China's economic model is also high growth, global trade, investment, often in large scale projects, including infrastructure, and technological innovation, as displayed by the BRI and what it has done in areas such as artificial intelligence then green technology. On the other hand, Russia has extraordinarily little economic diversification or innovation and is highly dependent on its natural resource exports, in part, energy. But the fact that there is big disparity in economic capabilities could mean that in the long term, the partnership will be stretched, as China's global ambitions could move ahead and surpasses Russia's more focused regional aspirations, and the balance of power in the alliance is shifted⁴¹. Russia is military expansionism strategist and China economic expansionism strategist.

Countries that remain aligned with US-led institutions, or are ideologically tied to liberal democracy, will come out against Sino-Russian led order on the global stage. With states in Europe and other Western aligned countries still relying on the US and its network of institutions, such as the World Bank, IMF and NATO, for their help in the economic, security and diplomatic areas, many countries still see the US as the central government of the world. In this regard, these countries are immune to authoritarian models of governance and are wary of the Sino-Russian orientation on strengthening states' sovereignty and noninterference. Countries in Eastern Europe, wary of Russia's past expansionism, do not want a world order where Moscow has more of a hold over the world. For instance, liberal democratic states and nations also might perceive the rise of authoritarian powers as a threat to the very political systems and values they value and tend to reject the shift towards a more authoritarian tolerant world order.

Moreover, the Sino-Russian alliance has a quite large hurdle to overcome in defeat the US hegemony in global finance, technology, and capital markets. However, the world is heading to de-dollarization, but the US is still the financial hub, with the dollar remaining as the dominant reserve, the most developed and influential capital markets exist in the country. While China has worked to create its own financial system, but it will reshape the global financial system if it becomes reality, giving the Chinese bloc a powerful advantage. Russia's economy is intertwined with international energy markets, but after its war it is cutoff from world so such system will benefit it. Even though China has made efforts also with Russia to develop different financial systems and decrease dependence on the US such as the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and the alternative to SWIFT, western financial supremacy remains hard to dissolve. Global south particularly those that still heavily trade with Russia, are

keen to break away from the Western led financial order, but they still have a long way to go. The US dollar is still used in 80% of global trade settlements. China seems aware of the surmountable difficulties in disrupting that order⁴².

Another impediment to the progress of Sino-Russian efforts in technology is that the US and its allies continue to be dominant in areas including advanced semiconductor production, software development and leading-edge research in artificial intelligence, biotech, and quantum computing. Even China's technological advancement is less advanced than the existing Western products, and in many areas, it still relies on Western components and expertise. Russia's technology sector is lagging further to the back, even behind China. Capacity of the US to impose sanctions, restrict technology transfers and restrict access to key markets provides a constraint to the ability for China and Russia to fully decouple from the West and build their own self sufficient technological base⁴³.

18. Discussion

With the rise of their strategic alliance, China and Russia could cause major changes to basic international principles, mainly by supporting ways of ruling that mostly protect a country's power and avoid outside meddling which is in stark opposition to how the West sees things, focusing on democracy and rights of people. By favoring a state's sovereignty, the alliance weakens international protection for people, eases international standards for authoritarian governments, and helps them justify wrongdoing and shrug off criticism from abroad by saying it is interference in their internal affairs. Because of this, it is likely that human rights standards will be less respected internationally as there are those nations now agree with the Sino-Russian belief that handling human rights unilaterally is a priority above meeting international standards.

The strategies formed by the US and China will have a major influence on the international orders they help create. As the US has relied on alliances, using military partnerships such as NATO and its economic power to back democratic values, it is facing criticism from other nations about the reliability of its promises because of recent actions, including leaving Afghanistan and unilateral decision-making undermining allies. Unlike others, China's economic strategy, represented by the BRI, centers on investing in infrastructure and partnerships, not connecting this with how countries govern themselves which has helped it extend its influence in the Global South by serving as a trusted ally with firm respect for countries' sovereignty. China's growing might and boldness in regional disputes improve its chances of challenging the US.

The long-term geopolitical implications of the Sino-Russian alliance for countries dependent on either the US or China are significant with nations caught in the middle may face a dilemma as they navigate this growing divide, particularly within regional economic blocks. For countries aligned with the US, there may be increased pressure to conform to Western standards on governance and human rights, which could strain relationships with neighboring countries that favor closer ties with China or Russia. Conversely, countries leaning toward China might find themselves increasingly reliant on Beijing's economic investments but at the cost of compromising on human rights issues and democratic governance.

⁴⁰ Kendall-Taylor, A., Curtis, L., Johnston, K., & Schochet, N. (2024, November 12). *Russia and China in Central Asia: Cooperate, compete, or de-conflict?* Center for a New American Security.

<https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/russia-and-china-in-central-asia>.

⁴¹ Jayaprakash, R. S. (2025, February 3). *A decadal review of Russia-China economic relations*. Observer Research Foundation.

<https://www.orfonline.org/research/a-decadal-review-of-russia-china-economic-relations>

⁴² Freidin, E. (2024, December 31). *BRICS Pay as a challenge to SWIFT network*. The Interpreter. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/brics-pay-challenge-swift-network>

⁴³ Hillman, J. E. (2020, July 15). *China and Russia: Economic unequals*. Center for Strategic and International Studies. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-russia-economic-unequals>

Regional economic blocks, such as the ASEAN or the SCO, will play a pivotal role in determining the path countries choose to navigate these dynamics as members of these blocks may pursue policies that reflect a balance between the influence of both powers, seeking to leverage their positions for economic benefits without fully aligning with either camp. This balancing act may involve navigating complex relationships with both the US and China, as well as other regional powers, and could lead to a fragmentation of the global order into competing spheres of influence. The ability of countries to adapt to this evolving geopolitical landscape will shape the future of international relations and the norms that govern them.

19. Recommendation

It is important given the Sino-Russian partnership is growing, international organizations such as the UN, WTO and IMF led by US should proactively revise their strategy and efforts to be made to modernize and reform them to stay important in the changing world order to support global institutions which involve strengthening their ability to address emerging challenges like climate change and cyber threats. These institutions help strengthen multilateral methods and combat the erosion of unilateral decisions. Instead of strictly following the Western liberal path, these institutions ought to welcome all kinds of governance while with localized context following basic human rights, transparent dealings, and resolutions to conflicts by adapting policies, technologies, and organizational structures to better respond to these complex issues.

US foreign policy should be adjusted to match the new challenges of world politics. In place of a stiff competition with China and Russia, the EU should try to achieve common objectives, for example, through focused work on climate change, cyber safety, and public health matters through sustainable methods. A different approach in US diplomacy will help create a calmer global environment where people and governments prefer to negotiate peacefully, rather than argue. Western strategy of development aid strategies that often combine funding with initiatives like capacity-building and conditions which does not align with local contexts should end and provide unconditional aid for development to combat Sino Russian axis which at whom countries would otherwise look at.

Also, making stronger ties with rising economies and local groups like ASEAN helps countries deal with the impact of China's BRI. With options for Asian investment in economy, the US can increase its importance in key parts of the world and decrease the reliance of those countries on the Sino-Russian economy. With this policy, the US would help nations gain the ability to choose their economic partners on their own. An alternative program must focus more on the Global South and develop alternative options to the Belt and Road that are not too strongly linked to political conditions. Such an adaptation will help maintain global stability to changes in the international system.

As a solution to a Sino-Russian-led order that may defend nations' sovereignty while overlooking human rights, the US should support a more diverse way of running global affairs. It hopes to maintain the independence of states together with respecting human rights and democracy. Splitting its attention between these goals allows the US to deliver a way for them to cooperate without losing basic democratic principles.

Powerful technology cooperation helps ensure a strong place among international players. The nation could make technological cooperation stronger by using AUKUS and the Quad, working on new plans for artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and space exploration together. Spending more on partnered technology will help the US keep up with China's technology development and continue to lead in the world. It is especially important for democracies to defend themselves against

authoritarian forces, mainly because of threats from the partnership between China and Russia. The process involves looking after digital infrastructures, improving government democracy, and fostering civil society groups.

The US should direct efforts aimed at guarding democratic institutions from threats by authoritarian governments and gaining worldwide support for democracy. Working toward internal fortitude and democratic principles will allow the US to help democracies remain strong in a world ruled by more than one superpower.

20. Conclusion

Sino-Russian led world order envisages a quite different approach which is in contrast from the U.S led world order that has been fiercely criticized for selectively applying the rules and furthering its national interests by their interventions, sanctions, and prioritization of key strategic alliances. The alternative order is an order rooted in state sovereignty, non-interference, and pragmatic co-operation, and attractive to states that want more freedom in their decision making with little external pressure to democratize or to reform their human rights as the case may have been. But the ramifications of such a shift to global governance would be monumental, for both authoritarian and democratic politics differently.

A Sino-Russian led order could, for authoritarian regimes, embolden a greater likelihood of legitimacy and support since those conditionalities to first grant democracy or human rights in Western aid and partnerships may make it easier for authoritarian governments to augment their rule while equally increasing economic and security cooperation with the West. This suits their aim to domestic governance from international interference. Additionally, the SCO could also expand its influence and provide other models of regional cooperation based on mutual benefits instead of ideological compatibility. It could also make authoritarianism more firmly entrenched globally because states must have no compelling reason to engage in political reforms to gain international economic and diplomatic opportunities.

For democratic states, this shift poses challenging questions. Cosmopolitanism does not derogate directly from regionalist positions that may be more compatible with US retreat or restricted understandings of its legitimacy, since countries as resistant to the hegemony of US power and as critical of its selective rule enforcement may find local order beneficial in which other powers, such as China and Russia, join by offering forms of partnership without ideological strings attached, that downplay the centrality of universal norms like human rights and the rule of law to existing democratic frameworks. Traditional bearers of these values in international institutions may become irrelevant or will go through fundamental changes to accommodate the Sino-Russian vision. In this, democratic norms are eroded around the world, and it could end up being an environment for what becomes a more transactional and less value oriented international system.

In broader terms, global governance under a Sino-Russian order could shift from universalism to regionalism under decentralization where instead of overarching institutions like the UN dominating international relations, regional blocs and will become the primary drivers for cooperation which will allow for more tailored and culturally relevant governance structures but could also fragment international consensus on critical issues such as climate change, public health, and conflict resolution. The lack of a unified moral compass might exacerbate global challenges, as individual states prioritize narrow national interests over collective action.

It is rise of a Sino-Russian led order would reshape the balance of power is established in the international relations and provided a shield against outside interference and a stage to expand might

toward authoritarian states and a differentiator and risk to democracy's bedrock values for democracies at the same time. In this changing horizon, the global governance framework could well become more pluralistic and yet more fragmented, thereby making it imperative for nations to live in a world that is deficient in cooperation, excellent in competition, and less and less subject to universal norms.

Currently the world is at a stage where it cannot afford a mistake or lag. Any step where existing order states slowdown will allow the rising order to take its place imminently. The new order is increasingly closing in on the gap with the existing order and is providing wide space for opportunities for global south states.

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